Hanoi FC vs Hanoi Police FC: A clash between the best and how Bandović's side came out on top

The hype around Hanoi's derby was justified when both teams gave the fans a spectacle at Hang Day. At the end, Bandović's Hanoi side came out on top thanks to his tactical decisions.

Entering the second of the three consecutive Hanoi derbies (between Hanoi, Hanoi’s Police, and Viettel) in the first three weeks of the V-League 1 season, there was a level of expectation from the fans that both teams would treat them to a spectacle. The (good) off-field drama that Hanoi’s social media team created with their pre-match poster added another level of excitement that this match brought to the fans, especially for Hanoi’s fans. Then, Hanoi’s Police’s fans had their own reply to that drama by displaying a banner saying “This is Hanoi!”, indicating that the colour red, Hanoi’s Police main colour, is the colour of Vietnam’s capital.

Yet, when the final whistle was blown, the dominant colour at Hang Day on that Thursday night was purple after an excellent performance from the Hanoi players. Božidar Bandović’s side executed their game plan well and controlled the match thanks to the Montenegrin’s pragmatic approach and a few standout performances. In this article, we will dive deep into the tactical points that helped Bandović and his players came out on top against Paulo Foiani’s Hanoi’s Police.

A slight change in formation

One of the surprises that Bandović brought to this clash was the fact that he switched to a 3-4-1-2 rather than choosing to remain with the 3-4-2-1, the formation that he used in the opening match with Viettel. It was not a significant change in general, but when taking in account Hanoi’s Police 4-4-2 formation, we can see why Bandović opted to make that change.

When building attacks, the striker pairing of Lucão and William Henrique looked to pin down Hanoi’s Police centre-backs Huynh Tan Sinh and Bui Tien Dụng (for the purpose of distinction, I will use Tien Dụng to refer to Hanoi’s Police #16 and Tien Dũng to refer to #24 in goal). Meanwhile, with Marcão and Do Hung Dung dragging the opposition’s central midfield pairing forward, Hanoi’s #10 Nguyen Van Quyet would be able to work in the space between Hanoi’s Police’s defensive lines.

This is the space where Van Quyet thrives in since he is able to receive passes in this area, control the ball, and then lay it off to the strikers up front. He can also move to either side to help with moving the ball down the wing, an attacking play that Bandović preferred his team to execute in this match.

But in order to create space in between the defensive lines for Van Quyet to operate in, Hanoi used a combination of three centre-backs and the central midfielder pairing to circulate the ball and lure the first two defensive lines to press them. Obviously Hanoi’s Police would have numerical superiority if they chose to press, but both outside centre-backs Do Duy Manh and Nguyen Thanh Chung intentionally stayed slightly further from the central centre-back Bui Hoang Viet Anh. This allowed the outside-centre-backs to connect with both wing-backs and gave them two possible forward passing options should the opposition started to press, giving Hanoi a way to bypass the press and caught their opposition’s defensive line in a vulnerable state (without support from the midfielders).

The wing-backs and Marcão

As mentioned, Bandović preferred his team to focus on attacking down the wings and Hanoi is not an exception. Because of this, both wing-backs will have to play a very important role in not only the build-up phase, but also in the team’s attack, and both Nguyen Van Vi (left wing-back) and Tran Van Kien (right wing-back) had proved how influential they were in this match.

When Hanoi had the ball, it was expected that both Van Vi and Van Kien stayed high up the pitch to provide width for the attacking situation. While Van Vi was usually seen staying very wide on the left, Van Kien was doing something different on the right as he moved slightly inside from his usual position, specifically into the right half-space. This was because playing in front of him was William and the Brazilian striker had the tendency to move close to the touchline whenever the team were in possession. In the second half, when William moved to the left-hand side, Van Kien and Van Vi swapped responsibility with each other as Van Vi would move inside to create space for William and Van Kien stayed wide to provide width.

Van Kien moving into the right half space also meant he could attack the space in behind Hanoi’s Police’s central midfielders and unsettled them at the same time. This allowed Hanoi to create numerical superiority in the central area when they attacked and avoided playing into the trap that their opponent had set down both flanks.

Going up against two of the best, if not the best, full-backs in Vietnam right now (Doan Van Hau on the left and Ho Tan Tai on the right) would be a battle that both Van Vi and Van Kien were likely to be on the losing side. But Van Vi received plenty of support from Van Quyet and Lucão on the left, while William with his outstanding dribbling ability (in comparison to the dribbling standard of the V-League) went head-to-head with Van Hau on the right and came out on top on several occasions.

Another player that I want to highlight in this section is Marcão Silva, Hanoi’s #77. Since arriving from Cuiabá, he has shown such a difference in quality with his passes and movements, something that had and will prove to be very crucial in how Hanoi play out from the back this season. Take this situation from the first minute of the match as an example.

When Duy Manh and Hung Dung tried to play their way out of trouble, Marcão watched the situation happened while also looked for a potential space where he could move into. He immediately spotted the space in the central area but waited until Hanoi’s Police’s striker Gustavo Henrique moved back into his position to start moving. When he reached his destination, Gustavo had closed Hung Dung down but Marcão was already in a position where he could receive the ball from Duy Manh, and he did just that to help Hanoi switched the play. Unfortunately, the ball ended up in Van Vi’s control a bit later on and he conceded possession, leading to a shot that was saved.

With the standard of foreign central midfielders that came and left V-League in previous seasons, some players would have chosen to move forward or move horizontally to near the byline to receive the ball. Even for domestic central midfielders, most would have not made the same move that Marcão did because they would never spot the unoccupied space. This is why I was surprised when watching Marcão in this match as his passing and ability to spot unoccupied space to move into is something that I have not seen in the league, probably since Lee Nguyen came and played for Ho Chi Minh City. A small move, I know, but the move just oozes the quality that the league have been craving for a while.

Marcão also worked well with Van Quyet up front to allow Hanoi’s #10 to drop deep and receive the ball whenever there was a space opened up and Van Quyet wished to do so. The Brazilian central midfielder would move slightly forward to the space in front of one of the opposition’s central midfielders to prevent him from stepping out of position. Then Van Quyet could drop deep and asked for the ball from the centre-backs or from Hung Dung to make a long pass towards the strikers or bring it forward by himself (the outcome that Van Quyet did not achieve in the situation below).

Mid-block and overload

Quick on transition, wing-oriented, and relied on crosses to get the ball into the box. In order for Hanoi to execute these three attacking traits during the match, they had to be solid at the back to limit the attacking threat from Hanoi’s Police. This was where Bandović’s signature mid block came into handy.

Hanoi still remained slightly conservative when they were out of possession as they did not try to press the opposition relentlessly, but rather tried to be smart and picked the right time to engage with Hanoi’s Police’s players. Setting up in a 5-2-3 shape, the purpose of having the three attacking players staying on the same line and close to each other was to allow one of the two strikers to jump at the opposition’s full-backs when he became a potential passing option for the centre-backs. Behind the front three, Hanoi’s central midfielders followed the opposition’s central midfielders very closely to prevent them from attacking their defensive line.

But should one of Hanoi’s Police’s central midfielders, usually Jhon Clay (#35), dropped deep to receive the ball, the coordination between Hanoi players begun. Marcão, who usually followed Clay, would abandon his position to move back and screen the defensive line. Meanwhile, both strikers took up the responsibility to press the centre-backs and allowed Van Quyet to follow Clay when he came for the ball. This was done to prevent the influence of the foreign central midfielder on the game and they did it well that Clay did not have too many opportunities to support his teammates or dictate the game.

One of Bandović’s preferred instructions when his team was defending is to block the central area and guide the opposition wide, where they can regain possession through an overload. The positioning of the front three in this match helped Hanoi executed that instruction and on many occasions, Hanoi’s Police found themselves unable to attack down the central area and had to result in making passes out wide and tried to play their way out of trouble.

Creating an overload out wide to regain possession is one of the most common defending strategies, yet, when executed perfectly, it is very effective. With a back five, Hanoi were able to have two defenders stepping out to create an overload with the midfielders and the attackers up front. This allowed Bandović’s players to block possible passing options around the ball carrier while also creating a possible 2v1 situation with the ball carrier himself. With no option left, the ball carrier had no choice but to switch the play or to pass the ball back, two options that Hanoi would definitely prefer the ball carrier to do.

When the ball was switched to the opposite flank, Hanoi would have three defenders ready to defend against a potential attack since they were not involved in the overload. Because the opposition had try to make up the number deficit on the opposite side, they were left with not many players to receive the switch-the-play pass and, subsequently, create an attack with it. As such, Hanoi’s defenders would be able to delay the attack until the rest of the team got back into their defensive shape and started another overload on the opposite side of the pitch.

The role of Hanoi’s back five was crucial to how they pressed and defended for the majority of the match. Usually, the wing-backs would be able to push forward and join the press with the players up front. But in this case, both Van Vi and Van Kien stayed back with the centre-backs to prevent Hanoi’s Police from gaining a numerical advantage at the back.

Having an extra defender to go up against a front four allowed four Hanoi defenders to have the ease of mind to follow the opposition’s attackers tightly. This was because the extra defender, usually one of the centre-backs, would be able to cut passes or clearing crosses that were coming towards them either from both flanks or down the central area. Bandović were prepared to have one player less to press the opposition if that meant his team were more secured at the back.

Hanoi’s mid block was put to the test frequently inside the second half, when they slightly dropped their tempo and allowed the opposition to control the match. But it also created plenty of opportunities for them to set up counter-attacking situations when the opposition had pushed forward so frequently. This was one of the reasons that Hanoi were able to get into Hanoi’s Police’s penalty box more often inside the second half as the opposition usually found themselves outnumbered to defend counter-attacks.

Yet, even though both of Van Quyet’s goals inside the second half did not come from any of the counter-attacking opportunities, they still demonstrated Bandović’s style very clear. There were similarities in both goals as they both came from a well-drilled short combinations out wide and a cross from both wing-backs was the assist for Van Quyet’s header (for the first goal) and the initial shot (for the second goal - before his tap-in after the shot was saved). The simplest things, yet Bandović’s side executed them very well to come out on top in this derby.

Conclusion

Some might call Bandović’s approach and style “pragmatic” and I definitely agree with that assessment. But I also prefer to see his approach as “doing the simple things the best way”. The Montenegrin manager only made a few changes before entering this match, and they were not significant either, but rather trusted his players to do the job. Yet, those changes proved to be the significant factors behind Hanoi’s first win of the season.

As I have mentioned in my data preview of Bandović, the future is positive for Hanoi with the Montenegrin at the helm, ignoring the unimpressive results that he had at Chennaiyin. After the first few matches, it is clear that the club have found the right man to lead them to the future along with his emphasis on “doing the simple things the best way”. We might yet to see the best version of his Hanoi side, but the tactical improvements that he brought to the V-League have made the league way more interesting to watch.